Soviet Diversion of United States Technology: The Circumvention of Cocom and the United States Reexport Controls, and Proposed Solutions by Plousadis, James
Fordham International Law Journal
Volume 7, Issue 3 1983 Article 5
Soviet Diversion of United States Technology:
The Circumvention of Cocom and the United
States Reexport Controls, and Proposed
Solutions
James Plousadis∗
∗
Copyright c©1983 by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berke-
ley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj
Soviet Diversion of United States Technology:
The Circumvention of Cocom and the United
States Reexport Controls, and Proposed
Solutions
James Plousadis
Abstract
This Note examines the Soviet diversions of United States technology and suggests possible
countermeasures. Part I examines diversions and their impact on United States national security.
Parts II and III review present United States and Western export and reexport controls and the
problems with these controls. Parts IV and V introduct and evaluate proposals offered to modify
Western export policy to stop, or at least to impede, Soviet diversions.
SOVIET DIVERSION OF UNITED STATES
TECHNOLOGY: THE CIRCUMVENTION
OF COCOM AND UNITED STATES REEXPORT
CONTROLS, AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
The inherent contradiction of capitalism is that it develops rather
than exploits the world. The capitalistic economy plants the seeds of
its own destruction in that it diffuses technology and industry,
thereby undermining its own position.
-V.I. Lenin*
INTRODUCTION
Since World War II, the United States has maintained na-
tional security through technological superiority in strategic and
tactical weapons, offsetting the Soviet Union's numerical advantage
in nuclear and conventional arms.' This qualitative superiority
stems from the United States lead in scientific and technological
development. 2 The Soviet Union has sought to neutralize this ad-
*DEFENSE SCIENCE BD. TASK FORCE, U.S. DEFP'T OF DEFENSE, AN ANALYSIS OF EXPORT
CONTROL OF U.S. TECHNOLOGY-A DOD PERSPECTIVE at i (1976) (quoting Vladimir I. Lenin),
reprinted in Extension of the Export Administration Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
International Finance of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 243 (1976).
1. See Transfer of United States High Technology to the Soviet Union and the Soviet
Bloc Nations: Hearings Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate
Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1982) (statement of Sen. Nunn)
[hereinafter cited as Transfer of United States High Technology]; CENT. INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY REP., SoviET ACQUISITION OF WESTERN TECHNOLOGY 1 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
CIA REPORT], reprinted in Transfer of United States High Technology, supra, at 7-23. By
1982, the Soviet Union had stockpiled more than 2350 ballistic missiles containing over 6300
warheads with a combined throw weight, or payload, equivalent to over 11.2 million pounds
of explosives. Conversely, the United States possessed 1700 missiles equipped with approxi-
mately 7200 warheads with a total throw weight of over four million pounds. Gelb, U.S.
Forging a New Concept for Curbing Strategic Arms, N.Y. Times, May 2,1982, at 1, col. 5, at
16, col. 4. But "[w]hile the Soviet Union leads in pounds of throw weight, they do not use it
efficiently. The United States, on the other hand, through miniaturization and advanced
technology, has increased the overall effectiveness of the throw weight at its disposal." R.
ALDRIDGE, FIRST STRIKE!: THE PENTAGON'S STRATEGY FOR NUCLEAR WAR 55 (1983).
2. While the United States and other Western nations have enjoyed scientific and
technological superiority over the Russians and the Soviets since the time of Peter the Great,
R. MASSIE, PETER THE GREAT: His LIFE AND WORLD 232 (1981), there is evidence that this lead
has been whittled down in recent years through the activities of Soviet intelligence agencies:
"Soviet acquisition of computer and microelectronic technology over the past decade has
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vantage by acquiring United States and other Western technology
through both legal and illegal means. 3 Most of the Western military
technology acquired by the Soviets4 has been gathered through the
activities of the KGB5 and the GRU.6 In addition to their espionage
activities, these organizations have established "dummy" business
enterprises that divert 7 high technology from the West to the Soviet
Union. 8
These "dummy" business operations circumvent" both United
States reexport controls established under the Export Administra-
allowed the Soviets to reduce the U.S. lead in these technologies from 10 to 12 years in the
mid-1960's to the present 3 to 5 years." 129 CONG. REc. H7459 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1983)
(statement of Rep. Courter).
3. See CIA REPORT, supra note 1, at 2-3; S. REP. No. 664, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-11
(1982) (statement of Dr. Jack Vorona, Director, Science and Tech. Info., Defense Intelli-
gence Agency). Dr. Vorona lists six Soviet methods for obtaining U.S. technology: publicly
disseminated U.S. government publications, student exchanges, scientific exchanges, estab-
lishment of marketing and manufacturing companies within the United States, espionage,
and diversions. Of these, the latter two constitute the illegal means of acquisition. Id. at 2-3;
see also infra note 32 (discussing problems with legal means).
4. See Transfer of United States High Technology, supra note 1, at 235-36 (statement of
Adm. Bobby R. Inman, former Deputy Director, Cent. Intelligence Agency); CIA REPORT,
supra note 1, at 1. Admiral Inman notes that the Soviets have acquired 70% of the militarily
related technology from the West through Soviet and Eastern bloc intelligence services.
Transfer of United States High Technology, supra note 1, at 235-36. Most of the remainder
was acquired through legal purchases and study of publicly disseminated publications, Id.
Student and scientific exchanges accounted for a very small number of significant acquisi-
tions. Id. See CIA REPORT, supra note 1, at 3.
5. The letters KGB are an acronym for Kornitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (Com-
mittee of State Security). Kohan, The KGB, TIME, Feb. 14, 1983, at 30. The KGB can best be
described as the Soviet Union's secret police, performing a role similar to the Gestapo and the
SS in Nazi Germany; it is the Communist Party's political action arm comprised of the party
elite. See id. at 30-33. Having no direct counterpart in the United States, the KGB's role
encompasses that of the CIA, FBI, National Security Agency, Secret Service, Customs Service
and Border Patrol. See id. at 30. The number of agents within the KGB is estimated at
700,000. Id.
6. The letters GRU are an acronym for Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye Upravleniye (Chief
Intelligence Directorate of the Soviet Military). The GRU often assists the KGB in its
operations. See id. at 33.
7. See CIA REPORT, supra note 1, at 3. In discussing the Soviet acquisition of Western
technology the term "diversion" is used in two different contexts. Id. The first, which may be
called territorial diversion, involves the establishment of dummy corporations by Soviet
operatives in the West who fraudulently purchase U.S. technology directly from the United
States or repurchase it from U.S. allies and then ship those items to the Soviet Union. Id. The
second, which may be deemed commodity diversion, involves the diversion of a particular
commodity from a civilian to a military application. Id. The first type of diversion is the
subject of this Note.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 13-35.
9. See CIA REPORT, supra note 1, at 2.
EXPORT CONTROLS
tion Act of 197910 (EAA) and multilateral strategic export controls
established among the United States and its allies through the Coor-
dinating Committee of the Consultative Group on Export Con-
trols" (COCOM). The resulting diversion erodes the United States'
qualitative superiority in military science and technology and con-
sequently threatens the collective security of the Western nations.' 2
This Note examines the Soviet diversions of United States tech-
nology and suggests possible countermeasures. Part I examines di-
versions and their impact on United States national security. Parts
II and III review present United States and Western export and
reexport controls and the problems with these controls. Parts IV
and V introduce and evaluate proposals offered to modify Western
export policy to stop, or at least to impede, Soviet diversions.
I. SOVIET DIVERSIONS
The Soviet Union's diversions of United States high technology
are accomplished primarily through its KGB and GRU.' 3 The num-
ber of KGB and GRU operatives devoted to covert acquisition of
Western technology increased significantly during the 1970's. 14 By
1982, these agencies employed several thousand technology "collec-
tion officers.' 5 Additionally, when operating in Western Europe,
Soviet agents often cooperate with intelligence agencies of other
Eastern bloc nations.' 6
The Soviet Union circumvents United States and Western ex-
port controls through the use of "false flag" or front operations.' 7
10. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
11. See infra notes 36-53 and accompanying text.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 28-35.
13. See supra text accompanying notes 4-6.
14. CIA REPORT, supra note 1, at 2.
15. Id.
16. Transfer of United States High Technology, supra note 1, at 37-54; See CIA RFa'OnT,
supra note 1, at 2, 3, 6; Six Now Expelled in Belgian Espionage, N.Y. Times, Aug. 25, 1983,
at A5, col. 5.
17. See Transfer of United States High Technology, supra note 1, at 4; CIA REPoRT,
supra note 1, at 2-3; 129 CONG. REc. H7459 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1983) (statement of Rep.
Courter); Kohan, supra note 5, at 42; Kessler, High Tech Piracy, Wall St. J., Feb. 15, 1984,
at 1, col. 1; Vinocur, A Trail of Western Technology is Followed to the K.G.B. 's Door, N.Y.
Times, July 25, 1983, at Al, col. 4; Farnsworth, Washington Watch: Smuggling Technology,
N.Y. Times, June 28, 1982, at D2, col. 1; Rositzke, Industry and the KGB, N.Y. Times, July
22, 1981, at A23, col. 2. For a description of the Soviet's State Committee on Science and
Technology (GKNT), which is charged with determining what types of technology the KGB
1984]
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Soviet agents establish dummy business enterprises that fraudu-
lently purchase United States technology legally obtained by for-
eign firms, chiefly in Western Europe and Japan. 8 Once the Soviet
"front" company has purchased the desired goods, it ships them to
the Soviet Union or another Eastern European bloc nation. 9 While
most diversions occur in Western Europe, some are attempted by,
or at the instigation of, Soviet agents in the United States. 20
and GRU will attempt to divert, see CIA REPORT, supra note 1 at 2; 129 CONG. REC. H7459
(daily ed. Sept. 26, 1983) (statement of Rep. Courter).
18. See Kohan, The KGB, TIME, Feb. 14, 1983, at 42.
19. For descriptions and illustrations of Soviet procedures, see CIA REPORT, supra note
1, at 3; Kohan, supra note 5, at 41-42; Kessler, supra note 17, at 1, col. 1; Vincour, supra
note 17, at Al, col. 4; Lindsey, U.S. Gaining in Efforts to Stem Loss of High Technology
Industrial Secrets, N.Y. Times, Apr. 30, 1983, at 9, col. 1; The Department of Commerce's
indications of potential diversions were submitted for the record by Representative Roth, 129
CONG. REC. H7454 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1983):
INDICATIONS OF POTENTIAL ILLEGAL EXPORTS
Listed below are some of the "red flag" indications that signal possible illegal
exports or diversions. The listing is not exhaustive; it is provided by the Department
of Commerce, Office of Export Enforcement, as an aid to further public awareness
and the private sector's effort to combat illegal exportation of U.S. technology.
1. Customer's/purchasing agent's reluctance to provide end-use of end-user
information;
2. Performance/design requirements incompatible with destination country
resources or environment, or with consignee's line of business;
3. Stated end-use incompatible with the customary or known industrial appli-
cations for the equipment being purchased;
4. Stated end-use incompatible with consignee's line of business;
5. Stated end-use incompatible with the technical capability of the consignee
or destination country;
6. Customer willingness to pay cash for a large value item or order;
7. Little or no customer business background information available;
8. Apparent lack of customer familiarity with the commodity's performance/
design characteristics or uses;
9. Customer's/purchasing agent's declination of installation or service con-
tracts that are normally accepted similar transactions;
10. Ill-defined delivery dates or the use of delivery locations inconsistent with
the type of commodity or established practices;
11. Use of freight forwarders as ultimate consignees;
12. Use of intermediate consignee(s) whose location/business is incompatible
with purported end-user's nature of business or location;
13. Packaging or packing requirements inconsistent with shipping mode and/
or destination; and
,14. Evasive responses to questions regarding any of the above as well as
whether equipment is for domestic use, export or reexport.
Id.
20. See Transfer of United States High Technology, supra note 1, at 26, 37, 54, 57, 94-
96, 122-24, 434; CIA REPORT, supra note 1, at 5; S. REP. No. 664, supra note 3, at 11, 12-13,
EXPORT CONTROLS
In 1982 and 1983, major cases of attempted Soviet diversions
involved the Digital Equipment Corporation's VAX 11/782 com-
puter and the Perkin-Elmer Micralign 200's.21 In an elaborate effort
to circumvent United States and COCOM controls, the VAX 11/
782 was shipped from New York via South Africa and West Ger-
many to Sweden. 22 United States authorities learned that the VAX
11/782, used for computer production, elecromagnetic design, and
structural analysis, was to be diverted to the Soviet Union. 23 At the
request of the United States, components of the VAX 11/782 were
seized by West German 24 and Swedish25 authorities.
In the Micralign 200 case, two United States-made machines
that manufacture microcircuitry were sold to a Swiss company,
Favag, S.A. 26 Favag immediately resold them to another Swiss
company, Eler Engineering. The machines were subsequently
shipped to Paris where they suddenly vanished. They are now
believed to be in Soviet possession. 27
Soviet diversions of United States high technology are signifi-
cant because they constitute a serious threat to United States na-
tional security as well as the collective security of our allies. 28 When
23-25; Zonderman, Policing High-Tech Exports, N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1983, § 6 (Magazine),
at 100; U.S. Jury Indicts 5 for Exporting Computer Equipment to Bulgaria, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 6, 1983, at 44, col. 1; Export Trial Stymied by Departure, N.Y. Times, May 19, 1983,
at D19, col. 1; U.S. Investigates Selling of Technology to Soviet, N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1981,
at A15, col. 1.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 22-27.
22. For the VAX 11/782 story as it developed, see Werner, U.S. Has Bonn Stop Soviet-
Bound Computer, N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1983, at Al, col. 3; Burks, Moscow-Bound Com-
puter Is Seized, N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1983, at A3, col. 1; Swedes Seize 2d Shipment of
Equipment, N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1983, at A3, col. 4; Last Minute Bust in Hamburg, TIME,
Nov. 28, 1983, at 34; Computer Programs Headed for Soviet Seized by Swedes, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 29, 1983 at All, col. 1. See also Transfer of United States High Technology, supra note
1, at 71, 74, 76, 78-80; Kessler, supra note 17.at 1, col. 1. (description of the activities of
Richard Mueller and his partner, Volker Nast, who are believed to have been responsible for
the attempted diversion of the VAX 11/782).
23. See supra note 22.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See infra note 27.
27. See Kohan, supra note 5, at 41; Vinocur, supra note 17, at A6, col. 6. For instances
of other, less well-documented diversions, see CIA RFEoRT, supra note 1, at 2, 6; 129 CONG.
REc. H8272 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1983) (statement of Rep. Hunter); Farnsworth, supra note 17.
at D2, col. 1; supra note 18 and accompanying text.
28. See CIA REPoRT, supra note 1, at 1.
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the Soviet Union acquires United States technical hardware and
data with "dual uses," 21 its military development is accelerated at a
far lower research and development expense. 30 This reduces the
United States "lead time" in military technology and consequently
undermines United States defense posture.
31
In recent years the Soviets have managed, legally32 and ille-
gally, to acquire United States technology relating to computers,
microelectronics, signal processing, manufacturing, communica-
tions, laser guidance and navigation, structural materials, propul-
29. "Dual use" technology is "technology developed or manufactured in the United
States by the private sector mainly for commercial purposes but which in the hands of the
Soviets or another adversary can have military applications threatening U.S. national secur-
ity." S. REp. No. 664, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1982). See Transfers of United States
Technology, supra note 1, at 4; Zonderman, supra note 20, at 102. Zonderman states:
Although the United States Government has always restricted the sale of patently
military technology to the Russians, the 1970's were the decade of the semiconduc-
tor, when the lines between commercial and military electronic products became
hopelessly blurred. The same basic semiconductors and integrated circuits that go
into video games also go into missile-guidance systems. The same small computer
that can be used by an American moving company to make sure a vanload of
household goods gets from Cleveland to Boston can also be used by a Russian
commander to make sure a division of soldiers gets from Odessa to Prague. Military
planners envision the day when the laser technology that is now able to fuse
detached retinas will also be capable of disabling enemy communications satellites.
Id. at 125.
30. This proposition assumes that the Soviets are capable of producing such goods in
sufficient quantity and of comparable quality. Such an assumption is generally, though not
always, valid. See infra note 31 and accompanying text.
31. See Transfer of United States High Technology, supra note 1, at 113, 158; CIA
REPORT, supra note 1, at 10; 129 CoNG. REC. H7459 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1983) (statement of
Rep. Courter); Vinocur, The KGB Goes on the Offensive and The West Begins Striking Back,
N.Y. Times, July 24, 1983, at 9, col. 1; Taubman, Expulsions Tied to Fear of Technology
Leaks, N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 1983, § 1, at 8, col. 1; Kessler, supra note 17, at 1, col. 1; supra
note 1-2 and accompanying text.
32. Legal means of Soviet acquisition of U.S. technology include student/scientific
exchanges, study of publicly disseminated scientific and technical literature, and trade. See
Transfer of United States Technology, supra note 1, at 29, 111; CIA REPORT, supra note 1, at
1. While such legal means account for only 30% of the Soviet acquisitions of Western
technology, see Transfer of United States High Technology, supra note 4, at 235-36 (state-
ment of Adm. Bobby R. Inman, former Deputy Director, Cent. Intelligence Agency),
evidence of Soviet deceit is present even here. In student exchanges, Soviet participants are
often not students but actual scientists and technicians. Also, while "American exchange
students . . . might come to the Soviet Union to study Dostoyevski . . . Soviet students [do]
not go to the United States to study Faulkner. Their main purpose in the United States [is] to
obtain American technology." Id. at 31 (statement of "Joseph Arkov," an assumed name of a
former Soviet engineer).
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sion, acoustical and electro-optical sensors, and radars.3 3 This
know-how has been applied chiefly to Soviet ballistic missile, air-
craft, and tactical weapons systems. 34 United States intelligence
sources and other observers believe these operations will continue
well past the 1980's.3 5
II. REEXPORT CONTROLS
A. COCOM
In 1949, the United States and six of its European allies estab-
lished the Coordinating Committee of the Consultative Group,6 on
Export Controls (COCOM) to monitor and control the exchange of
strategic commodities with the Soviet bloc. 37 By 1983, COCOM
membership included Japan and all of the NATO countries except
33. CIA REPORT, supra note 1, at 6-9.
34. Id. See Taubman, supra note 31, at 8, col. 1. See also 129 CONG. REC. H7462 (daily
ed. Sept. 26, 1983) (statement of Rep. Solomon) (noting the similarity of technology used in
the U.S. Sidewinder air-to-air missile with that of the Soviet Atoll missile used to down KAL
Flight 007).
35. See CIA REPORT, supra note 1, at 11-15; Rositzke, Industry and the KGB, N.Y.
Times, July 22, 1981, at A23, col. 2; Farnsworth, supra note 17, at D2, col. 1 (quoting John
M. Waller, Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Enforcement and Operations). See also
Taubman, supra note 31, at 8, col. 1 (citing the CIA's opening of the Technology Transfer
Assessment Center, a new office within the Agency to monitor diversions).
36. Berman & Carson, United States Export Controls - Past, Present, and Future, 67
COLUM. L. REV. 791, 834-40 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Berman & Garson, Export Con-
trols]. The six allies were the United Kingdom, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and
Luxembourg. Id. at 834-35. Following France's military withdrawal from NATO and its
refusal to appoint a new chairman of the Consultative Group, the Group itself ceased to exist.
U.S. COMPT. GEN., EXPORT CONTROLS: THE NEED TO CLARIFY POLICY AND SIMPLIFY ADMINIS-
TRATION 7 (1979) [hereinafter cited as CoMPT. GEN. No. 2]; AM. ENTER. INST., PROPOSALS FOR
REFORM OF EXPORT CONTROLS FOR ADVANCED TECHNOLOcY 5 (1979) [hereinafter cited as AEI
PROPOSALS].
37. See The Export Administration Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Interna-
tional Economic Policy of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 45
(1983) [hereinafter cited as EAA '83]; Transfer of United States High Technology, supra note
1, at 157; Export Licensing: COCOM List Review Proposals of the United States: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on International Economic Policy and Trade of the House Comm. on
International Relations, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1978) [hereinafter cited as COCOM List
Review]; Extension of the Export Administration Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. oil
International Finance of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 133, 174 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Ext. EAA]; CIA REPORT, supra note 1, at
2 n.2; DEP'T OF COM., EXPORT ADMININISTRATION ANNUAL REPORT FY 1980, at 9 (1981);
COMPT. GEN. No. 2, supra note 36, at 2, 7; PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL REPORT ON MULTILATERAL
EXPORT CONTROLS 1 (1978) [hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S REPORT], reprinted in The Export
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Iceland and Spain. 3 The original participants agreed to formulate
a multilateral embargoed commodity list 39 under which each mem-
ber nation would restrict the export and, in the case of United
States goods, the reexport from its territory of listed goods.
40
The agreement requires that the embargo list be reviewed by
COCOM members every three or four years. 4' Each member may
submit "original proposals," "counter proposals," and "revised pro-
posals" to list-review proceedings. 42 Inclusion of an item on the
COCOM list requires the unanimous consent of COCOM mem-
bers. 43 While all COCOM proceedings are conducted in secret,
44
Administration Act: Agenda for Reform: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International
Relations of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1978); DEFENSE
SCIENCE BD. TASK FORCE, U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., AN ANALYSIS OF EXPORT CONTROL OF U.S.
TECHNOLOGY-A DOD PERSPECTIVE 18 (1976) [hereinafter cited as THE BucY REPORT], re-
printed in Ext. EAA, supra, at 243; U.S. CoMr-r. GEN., THE GOVERNMENT'S ROLE IN EAST-
WEST TRADE 26 (1976) [hereinafter cited as CoMrr. GEN. No. 1], reprinted in Ext. EAA,
supra, at 19; 19TH BATTLE ACT REPORT 2 (1966); STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS, 89TH CONG., 1ST SEss., A BACKGROUND STUDY ON EAST-WEST TRADE 4, 41
(Comm. Print 1965); 129 CONG. REC. H8344 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1983) (statement of Rep.
Kramer); AEI PROPOSALS, supra note 36, at 4; Abbott, Linking Trade to Political Goals:
Foreign Policy Export Controls in the 1970's and 1980's, 65 MINN. L. REV. 739, 807 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as Abbott, Linking Trade]; Bingham & Johnson, A Rational Approach to
Export Controls, 57 FOREIGN AFF. 894, 903-04 (1979); Note, Reconciliation of Conflicting
Goals of the Export Administration Act of 1979, 12 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUs. 415, 417, 455
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, Reconciliation].
38. The 15 COCOM members are Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the Federal Republic
of Germany, France, Greece, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portu-
gal, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. CIA REPORT, supra note 1, at 2 n.2.
DEP'T OF COM., supra note 37, at 9.
39. In addition to the strategic commodity embargo list with which this Note is con-
cerned, COCOM also maintains a munitions list and an atomic energy list through which the
member nations monitor and control the export of such items from their respective countries.
See Ext. EAA, supra note 36, at 174; Berman & Garson, Export Controls, supra note 36, at
835.
40. See supra note 38.
41. COCOM List Review, supra note 37, at 1; DEP'T OF COM., supra note 37, at 19;
PRESIDENT'S REPORT, supra note 37, at 1; Note, Reconciliation, supra note 37, at 432.
42. Under list review procedure, a member nation may submit "original proposals" four
months in advance; "counterproposals" 45 days in advance; and "revised proposals" at any
time during the 10 month review period, provided at least two members agree to the
submission. PRESIDENT'S REPORT, supra note 37, at 1-2. See COCOM List Review, supra note
37, at 81 (statement of William Barraclough, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Int'l Trade
Pol'y, Dep't of State).
43. See Ext. EAA, supra note 37, at 174; STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS, 89TH CONG., 1ST SESS., A BACKGROUND STUDY ON EAST-WEST TRADE, 5, 41 (Comm.
Print 1965).
44. See COCOM List Review, supra note 37, at 1; Bingham & Johnson, supra note 37,
at 904.
EXPORT CONTROLS
the criteria used for including items on the COCOM list have been
described in public herings as including: "(1) whether the items
constitute weapons or equipment for their production; (2) whether
the items incorporate unique technical know-how of military signif-
icance; and (3) whether the items represent materials in deficient
supply in relation to military potential in the communist coun-
tries."' 45 It is important to note that COCOM does not have formal
treaty status. Compliance with the determinations of the group as a
whole is voluntary as COCOM has no enforcement powers.
46
Once an item has been placed on the COCOM list, any mem-
ber nation wishing to permit the export of such item form within its
borders to the Soviet bloc must submit an "exception request" to
COCOM.4 To obtain an exception, the nation sends its COCOM
delegate48 an exception request application. If accepted by the
delegate, 49 it is transcribed into the COCOM format, translated
into French, and then distributed to the other delegates. 50 COCOM
rules provide for exception request decisions within 18 days of
submittal to the delegates. 5 An automatic grace period of two
weeks and additional extentions at the discretion of the submitting
member nation may lengthen the period of review. 52 After each
delegate has made a decision, COCOM issues an "advisory opinion"
to the submitting government in which the application is either
approved or denied. 53
1. United States Participation Through EDAC
United States participation in COCOM is coordinated by the
Economic Defense Advisory Committee (EDAC), which consists of
representatives form the Departments of State, Defense, Com-
merce, and the Treasury, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and
45. Bingham & Johnson, supra note 37, at 904.
46. See 19TIi BATTLE ACT REPORT 2 (1966); 129 CONG. REc. H8341 (daily ed. Oct. 19,
1983) (statement of Rep. Courter); Bingham & Johnson, supra note 37, at 904.
47. See PRESIDENT'S REPORT, supra note 37, at 2-3, 5; CoMPr. GEN. No. 1, supra note 37,
at 32, 34; Bingham & Johnson, supra note 37, at 904.
48. Ext. EAA, supra note 37, at 134-35 (statement of Arthur T. Downey, Deputy
Assistant Secretary for East-West Trade, Dep't of Com.).
49. Id. The delegate may, for political reasons, refuse the application.
50. Id.
51. COMPT. GEN. No. 2, supra note 36, at 11.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 10.
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the Central Intelligence Agency. 54 EDAC's primary responsibilities
are deciding which items on the United States Commodity Control
List (CCL) 55 will be submitted to COCOM for inclusion on CO-
COM's list, 56 soliciting approval for United States companies' ex-
ception requests, and receiving fellow members' exception re-
quests. 57 The criterion used by EDAC in considering exception
requests to non-Soviet bloc destinations is whether the commodity is
likely to be diverted to a proscribed destination. 58 Also considered
are the known reliability of the consignee, the intended use of the
equipment, and the appropriateness of the equipment for that
use. 59
Applications for United States approval of exception requests
are processed by the State Department, Bureau of Economic Af-
fairs, Office of East-West Trade (Office).60 The Office forwards the
request to EDAC's Working Group I (WG I) where the request is
evaluated.6' The application may also be initially considered in
EDAC's Executive Committee. 2 Should these groups disagree, the
request will be sent to the deputy assistant secretary level, 63 and
then possibly to EDAC6 4 itself. In the event of further disagree-
ment, the application may be referred to the National Security
Council's Under Secretaries Committee. 65 Should this committee
fail to agree to grant the exception request, the application is re-
viewed by the President.
54. COCOM List Review, supra note 37, at 74 (statement of William Root, Director,
Office of East-West Trade, Dep't of State); COMPr. GEN. No. 1, supra note 37, at 34.
55. See infra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
56. CoM-r. GEN. No. 1, supra note 37, at 32, 34.
57. Id.
58. Ext. EAA, supra note 37, at 137 (statement of Arthur T. Downey, Deputy Assistant
Secretary for East-West Trade, Dep't of Coin.).
59. Id.
60. See CoMP'r. GEN. No. 2, supra note 36, at 10; CoMvr. CEN. No. 1, supra note 37, at
30-31.
61. See CoMm. GEN. No. 2, supra note 36, at 10; COMPT. GEN. No. 1, supra note 37, at
34.
62. See CompTr. GEN. No. 2, supra note 36, at 10.
63. See CoMi-r. GEN. No. 2, supra note 36, at 10, 29. The deputy assistant secretary
level is referred to as "sub-EDAC." Id.
64. "EDAC" is comprised of those at the assistant secretary levels of the member
agencies. Id.
65. See CoMprr. GEN. No. 1, supra note 37, at 32, 34.
66. See CoMpr. GEN. No. 2, supra note 36, at 29; COMPT. GEN. No. 1, supra note 37, at
30-31, 34.
EXPORT CONTROLS
Another major responsibility of WG I is development of
United States COCOM list proposals with the advice of the Execu-
tive Committee. 67 In formulating such proposals, WG I consults
Technical Advisory Committees (TAC's), 6 8 comprised of industry
and government technicians and Technical Task Groups (TTG's),69
made up of government advisory personnel.
B. United States Controls: The EEA and Regulations
The Export Administration Act (EAA) is the United States'
single most important export control law. 70 The purpose of the EEA
is, inter alia, to protect United States national security by monitor-
ing and restricting exports of United States goods and technical data
while minimizing adverse impact on United States business interests
and the balance of trade. 71 Under the EAA, the Secretary of Com-
merce (Secretary) establishes and maintains the CCL. 72 With the
67. See COMPT. GEN. No. 2, supra note 36, at 19; COMPT. GEN. No. 1, supra note 37, at
34.
68. Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(h) (Supp. III 1979). See
CoMEr. GEN. No. 2, supra note 36, at 20; COMIT. GEN. No. 1, supra note 37, at 45. The
present system includes TAC's covering telecommunications equipment, computer systems,
computer peripherals and components, electronic instrumentation, and semiconductors and
semiconductor manufacturing and test equipment. COCOM List Review, supra note 37, at
80.
69. See COCOM List Review, supra note 37, at 76-80; CoMpr. GEN. No. 2, supra note
36, at 19. The present system includes TTG's covering metalworking machinery, chemicals,
metals, transportation equipment, telecommunications equipment, avionics and navigation
equipment, semiconductor equipment, electronic instrumentation and components, photo-
graphic equipment, computers, military equipment, and atomic energy equipment. CO-
COM List Review, supra note 37, at 79-80.
70. See Hoya, U.S. Export Licensing, in AMERICAN-SovIET TRADE: A JOINT SEMINAR ON
THE ORCANIZATIONAL AND LEGAL AsPECTS 98 (1976). The EAA is the successor to the Export
Control Act of 1949, ch. 11, 63 Stat. 7, amended by 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2021-2032 (1976 &
Supp. III 1979). See Berman & Garson, U.S. Export Controls, supra note 36, at 791-804.
71. See Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(2)(A) (1976 & Supp.
III 1979); EAA '83, supra note 37, at 1; Transfer of United States High Technology, supra
note 1, at 2; COCOM List Review, supra note 37, at 98 (statement of Stanley J. Marcuss,
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Indus. and Trade, Dep't of Com.); CoMr-r. GEN, No. 2, supra
note 37, at 1; 129 CONG. BEC. H8259 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1983) (statement of Rep. Roth); 129
CONG. REC. H7451, H7453, H7457 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1983) (statements of Reps. Bonker,
Zablocki, Bereuter); 15 C.F.R, § 370.1(a)(3) (1983); Note, Reconciliation, supra note 37, at
415; Zonderman, supra note 20, at 125.
72. Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2403(b) (1976 & Supp. III
1979). See also 15 C.F.R. § 399 (1983) (text of CCL).
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advice of the Secretary of Defense, 73 the Secretary catalogues mili-
tarily critical technologies; the export of which is denied to coun-
tries that threaten United States national security.7 1
The Secretary is also empowered to promulgate export admin-
istration regulations. 75 Under the Act, Congress requires that, in
issuing regulations to carry out national security controls, the Secre-
tary pay "particular attention .. .to . ..the need to take effective
measures to prevent the reexport of critical technologies from other
countries to countries that pose a threat to the security of the United
States."'76 Pursuant to that directive, the Secretary has formulated
section 374.1 of the Export Administration Regulations7 7 (Regula-
tions). Under section 374.1 no person may, without a Commerce
Department license, reexport a commodity from the nation to
which it was initially exported or export such commodity from the
United States with the knowledge that it will be reexported. 78
Section 374.1 applies to finished United States goods, 79 United
States component parts,80 and "United States-origin" technical
73. Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(d)(1), (d)(2) (Supp. III).
See also Note, Export Controls: Restrictions on the Export of Critical Technologies, 22 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 411, 411-14 (1981) (discussion of the Defense Department's role in the formulation
of the CCL).
74. See Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(a)(1) (1976 & Supp.
III 1979).
75. See id. § 2403(e); 15 C.F.R. §§ 368-399 (1983).
76. Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. § 2404(a)(3) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
77. 15 C.F.R. §§ 368-399 (1983).
78. The regulation provides:
Unless the reexport of a commodity previously exported from the United States
has been specifically authorized in writing by the Office of Export Administration
prior to its reexport, or is authorized under the permissive reexport provisions of §
374.2, or is otherwise authorized under any other provision of the Export Adminis-
tration Regulations, no person in a foreign country (including Canada) or in the
United States may:
(a) Reexport such commodity directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, from
the authorized country(ies) of ultimate destination; or
(b) Export such commodity from the United States with the knowledge that it
is to be reexported, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, from the authorized
country(ies) of ultimate destination.
15 C.F.R. § 374.1 (1983).
79. See id.; Hoya, supra note 70, at 98-99.
80. See supra note 78.
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data. 8' The President is authorized to enforce82 these reexport con-
trols by prohibiting or curtailing "the export of any goods or tech-
nology subject to the jurisdiction of the United States or exported by
81. Id. Technical data is defined as:
[I]nformation of any kind that can be used, or adapted for use, in the design,
production, manufacture, utilization, or reconstruction of articles or materials. The
data may take a tangible form, such as a model, prototype, blueprint, or an
operating manual; or they may take an intangible form such as technical service.
15 C.F.R. § 379.1(a) (1983).
Unlicensed reexports of technical data are also prohibited:
Unless specifically authorized by the Office of Export Administration, or otherwise
authorized under the provisions of paragraph (b) of this section, no person in the
United States or in a foreign country may:
(1) Reexport any technical data imported from the United States, directly or
indirectly, in whole or in part, from the authorized country(ies) of ultimate destina-
tion;
(2) Export any technical data from the United States with the knowledge that
it is to be reexported, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, from the authorized
country(ies) of ultimate destination; or
(3) Export or reexport to Country Group P, Q, W, Y, Z, or Afghanistan any
foreign produced direct product of U.S. technical data, or any commodity produced
by any plant or major component thereof that is a direct product of U.S. technical
data, if such direct product or commodity is covered by the provisions of § 379.4(f)
or § 379.5(e)(1) or (2).
15 C.F.R. § 379.8 (1983). See Hoya, supra note 70, at 98-99; supra note 71.
82. While the enforcement of the Export Administration Act has been left to the
Commerce Department, the recent fanfare given to Operation Exodus, see generally Trans-
fer of United States High Technology, supra note 1, at 194-98, 206-14; Zonderman, supra
note 20, at 103, a Customs Service program of export inspection and interdiction, has led to
calls for the transfer of enforcement to the Customs Service. See Transfer of United States
High Technology, supra note 1, at 97-99, 199; S. REP. No. 664, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 36-40
(1982). Supporters of such a transfer cite the myriad of overseas contacts developed by
Customs, see 129 CONG. REC. H7706, 7709 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1983) (statements of Reps.
Hutto and Courter), the success of Operation Exodus, see 129 CONG. REC. H7706 (daily ed.
Sept. 29, 1983) (statement of Rep. Hutto), and the weakness of the Commerce Department's
Compliance Division, which is presently responsible for the enforcement of U.S. export and
reexport controls. See Transfer of United States Technology, supra note 1, at 82-91; CoMPr.
GEN. No. 2, supra note 36, at 50-59. Those who oppose such a transfer, see e.g., S. RE. No.
664, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 40-41 (1982) (statement of Lawrence J. Brady, Assistant Secretary
for Trade Admin., Dep't of Com.), believe that only Commerce is competent to evaluate the
national security significance of interdicted technology, see 129 CONG. REC. H7708 (daily ed.
Sept. 29, 1983) (statement of Rep. Frenzel), and that Operation Exodus was a failure. Id. A
House bill, H.R. 3231, would retain Commerce as the primary enforcement agency of the
Export Administration Act, while relegating Customs to a minor role. H.R. 3231, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 103, 129 CONG. REC. H7698, H7699 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1983). A Senate
bill, S. 979, would install Customs as the major enforcement agency of the EAA while
reducing Commerce to a subsidiary role. S. 979, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 10 (1983). For
discussion of the other relevant provisions of H.R. 3231 and S. 979, see infra notes 161-63,
175-86, 194-96, 197-199 and accompanying text.
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any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States."8 3 The
United States has attempted to apply these reexport controls to
subsidiaries and affiliates of United States companies abroad that
reexport United States goods, parts or data. 84
The Secretary has promulgated regulations to implement sec-
tion 374.1.85 For example, section 374.386 requires full disclosure of
the identity of all parties in interest to each transaction. Regulation
36887 describes an Import Certificate/Delivery Verification (IC/
DV) system under which foreign importers certify to their respec-
tive governments that they will not reexport United States goods
except in accordance with their own nation's export control. 88 All
COCOM members participate in the IC/DV system. 89
83. Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(a)(1) (1976 & Supp. III
1979). The Act broadly defines a "United States person" as including "any foreign subsidiary
or affiliate (including any permanent foreign establishment) of any domestic concern which is
controlled in fact by such domestic concern." Id. § 2415(2) (emphasis added). See also infra
notes 84, 148-51 and accompanying text (discussion of the validity of the "controlled in fact"
definition).
84. See CoMpT. GEN. No. 1, supra note 37, at 28-29. The most well known case in
recent years involved Dresser France, a subsidiary of Dresser Industries, a Dallas-based
corporation organized under Delaware corporation law. See generally Recent Developments,
Export ControL-Challenge to the Validity of Department of Commerce Regulations Re-
stricting the Export of Oil and Gas Equipment and Technology to the Soviet Union-
Temporary Restraining Order Denied. Dresser Industries v. Baldridge, No. 82-2385 (D.
D.C. filed Aug. 23, 1982), 18 TEXAS INT'L L.J. 203 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Recent
Development, Export Controls]. In retaliation for Soviet involvement in the imposition of
martial law in Poland, President Reagan, in June 1982, banned the export and reexport of oil
and gas equipment, goods, and technology to the Soviet Union produced abroad by foreign
firms owned or controlled in fact by U.S. companies. Id. at 203. This ban specifically
included products made abroad by U.S. subsidiaries utilizing U.S. technical data. See 47 Fed.
Reg. 27,250 (1982). Dresser France, a corporation organized under French law, who had
previously contracted with Soviet foreign trade organizations for the sale of such goods,
sought, and was denied, a temporary restraining order against the ban. Dresser Indus. v.
Baldrige, No. 82-2385 (D.D.C. filed Aug. 23, 1982). Although the ban was formulated for
foreign policy reasons and therefore did not constitute an example of the national security
controls at issue in this Note, compare Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. app. §
2405 (1976 & Supp. III 1979) (foreign policy controls) with id. § 2404 (national security
controls), the Dresser case is illustrative of the broad reach of section 2415. Despite the fact
the Dresser transaction took place entirely in France and involved only French and Soviet
parties, Dresser France was still considered by U.S. authorities to be controlled in fact by its
U.S. parent. See Recent Developments, Export Controls, supra, at 203-08; infra notes 136,
148-50.
85. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 86-89.
86. 15 C.F.R. § 372.3(A) (1983). See also id. § 372.3(b)(2) (the ultimate consignee or
end-user of U.S. goods may not be a freight forwarder or forwarding agent).
87. Id. § 368 (1983). See Berman & Garson, Export Controls, supra note 36, at 839-40
(1967).
88. 15 C.F.R. § 368.1(a) (1983).
89. 15 C.F.R. § 375.3 (1983). See generally 25TH BAI'rLE AcT REPORT 40-53 (1973)
(summarizing the national control systems of COCOM countries).
EXPORT CONTROLS
Reexport license applications are administered by the Advisory
Committee on Export Policy (ACEP), an organization remarkably
similar to EDAC in both form and function. 0 Generally, reexport
license applications are received by the Department of Commerce,
Office of Export Administration, Operations Division (Division).,"
The Division screens the applications for completeness.9 2 Applica-
tions deemed complete are then forwarded to ACEP's Operating
Committee where the bulk of application evaluation and decision
making occurs. 3 The Operating Committee may also consult other
agencies such as the Departments of Defense, State, and Energy
and NASA for special information needed in the evaluation proc-
ess.9 4 If the Operating Committee fails to reach a unanimous deci-
sion to grant a reexport license, the application is forwarded to the
deputy assistant secretary level. 5 If further disagreements ensue,
the application is successively referred to ACEP itself,9" the Export
Administration Review Board,9 7 and then, if necessary, to the Presi-
dent.98
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE PRESENT
COCOM ARRANGEMENT
A. COCOM
1. Differing Attitude
Reexport control problems among COCOM nations stem in
large part from differing attitudes of the United States and its allies
regarding the use of economic sanctions. 9 COCOM's European
90. See ComPT. GEN. No. 1, supra note 37, at 31-35; see also supra text accompanying
note 54 (EDAC form and function). Like EDAC, ACEP is made up of representatives from
the Department of State, Department of Defense, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the
Treasury Department, and the Central Intelligence Agency. See CoMr. GEN. No. 1, supra
note 37, at 32-37.
91. CompT. GEN. No. 2, supra note 36, at 36.
92. Id.
93. See CoMer. GEN. No. 2, supra note 36, at 35, 37; see also Ext. EAA, supra note 37,
at 161-62 (statement of Dr. Shields, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Int'l Econ. Affs., U.S. Dep't
of Def.) (specific questions considered in determining whether the export of goods or technol-
ogy will significantly increase the military capability of the controlled country); COMiPr.
GEN. No. 1, supra note 37, at 32-33 (ACEP structure and procedure).
94. CoMr. GEN. No. 2, supra note note 36, at 34-35.
95. See CoMPT. GEN. No. 2, supra note 36, at 35-36. This review level is generally
known as "sub-ACEP." Id.
96. See id. at 35. ACEP review takes place at the assistant secretary level. Id.
97. See id. Board review occurs at the secretary level. Id.
98. See id.; CoMPr. GEN. No. 1, supra note 37, at 32-33.
99. See infra text accompanying notes 100-07.
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members, as well as Japan, have always depended more heavily
than the United States on international trade to sustain their econo-
mies.100 Thus, these COCOM members have often been more reluc-
tant than the United States to proscribe exports to the Soviet bloc. ' 0'
Due to its post-war dominance as an economic power, the United
States was temporarily able to persuade its allies to comply with its
export control policy. 0 2 This "persuasion" was accomplished
through the Battle Act,10 3 enacted in 1964, which restricted United
States aid to nations that exported strategic items to the Communist
bloc. However, the economic reemergence of the Western nations
and Japan increased their ability to compete with the United States
in the export market.'0 4 Moreover, the growing volume of trade
with the Soviet bloc minimized dependence on U.S. aid, destroying
the efficacy of the Battle Act. 0 5 These economic developments,
reinforced by the European nations' historic patterns of trade with
the East, 0 6 have led many United States officials to openly question
the strength of our allies' commitment to COCOM.10 7
Inclusion of a commodity on the COCOM list requires the
unanimous consent of COCOM members. 0 8 Thus, if any member
nation takes the position that the sale of an item would not be
significantly detrimental to Western security, then that item will
not be included on the COCOM list. As a result, COCOM member
nations are free to sell any goods controlled unilaterally by other
COCOM member nations, and unilateral attempts to control tech-
nology not on the COCOM list are useless where foreign availabil-
ity exists. 0
100. See Brigham & Johnson, supra note 37, at 905-06. Note, Reconciliation, supra note
37, at 445.
101. See Berman & Garson, Export Controls, supra note 36, at 841.
102. See AEI PROPOSALS, supra note 36, at 4; Berman & Garson, Export Controls, supra
note 36, at 834-36.
103. 22 U.S.C. §§ 1611-1613d (1964), superseded by Export Administration Act of
1979, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2416(e) (1976 & Supp. III 1979); see also Berman & Garson, Export
Controls, supra note 36, at 836-38 (discussing effect of the Battle Act).
104. See COMPT. GEN. No. 2, supra note 36, at 8; Abbott, Linking Trade, supra note
37, at 804; Note, Reconciliation, supra note 37, at 417.
105. See COMPT. GEN. No. 2, supra note 36, at 8.
106. See id. Bingham & Johnson, supra note 37, at 906.
107. See H.R. REP. No. 190, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1977); THE Bucy REPORT, supra
note 37, at 19; COMpr. GEN. No. 1, supra note 37, at 46.
108. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
109. See Note, The Export Administration Act of 1979: An Examination of Foreign
Availability of Controlled Goods and Technologies, 2 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 179, 185, 188
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Generally, the United States' COCOM partners have a more
relaxed attitude than the United States toward export control." 0
The restrictive United States attitude is evidenced by its disapproval
of nations that make available for transfer goods that the United
States has unilaterally excluded from export to the Soviet Union."'
COCOM's foreign availability problems are exacerbated by the fact
that Sweden, Austria, and Switzerland-three significant importers
of United States technology-do not belong to COCOM.1 2 These
nations are under no multilateral obligation to restrict the sale of
high-technology goods to the Soviet bloc."
3
2. The Problem of Enforcement
Another problem within COCOM is the low priority given to
the enforcement of COCOM controls by member nations." 4 Al-
though this passivity is difficult to substantiate in light of the se-
crecy surrounding COCOM proceedings," 5 United States officials
believe our COCOM allies ought to devote more funds and man-
power to COCOM control enforcement."16 In addition, the United
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, EAA]. Foreign availability also makes the imposition of
U.S. trade sanctions for foreign policy reasons similarly troublesome as seen in the difficulty
the United States encountered in attempting to enlist allied cooperation to thwart Soviet
construction of the Urengoi pipeline. See Abbott, Linking Trade, supra note 37, at 795-96,
800-10 (1981); Goldman, Why an Embargo Might Backfire, N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1983, § 3,
at 2, col. 3. See also Farnsworth, U.S. Lifts Its Curb On Sale to Soviet of Pipeline Gear, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 21, 1983, § 1, at 1, col. 6; Taylor, Caterpillar Greets U.S. Move; Sees Little
Immediate Effect, N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1983, § 1, at 16, col. 3 (effects on Caterpillar Corp.
of unilateral U.S. sanctions on the sale of pipeline gear to the Soviets by U.S. companies in
spite of foreign availability).
110. See supra text accompanying notes 100-07.
111. See supra note 100.
112. See supra note 38.
113. See Abbott, Linking Trade, supra note 37, at 807-08 (1981). See also H.R. RE,.
No. 190, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1977) (notes the business advantage accruing to these
nations from their nonmembership in COCOM).
114. See PRESIDENT's REPowr, supra note 37, at 5; H.R. REP. 190, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
20 (1977); COMp'r. CEN. No. 1, supra note 38, at 43; 129 CONG. REC. H8272 (daily ed. Oct.
18, 1983) (statement of Rep. Hunter); see also 129 CONG. REC. H7454 (daily ed. Sept. 26,
1983) (statement of Rep. Roth that in recent years the entire West German Federal Office of
Trade and Commerce was staffed by only 146 civil servants); Lachica, U.S. Worries Its High-
Tech Gear Reaches Communists Via Canada, Wall St. J., Mar. 14, 1984, at 34, col. I (noting
U.S. discontent with Canada's enforcement of export controls).
115. See Bingham & Johnson, A Rational Approach to Export Controls, 57 FOREIGN
AFFAiRS 894, 904 (1979).
116. See supra note 114.
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States considers the ultimate consignee end-use information re-
quired by COCOM member nations to be inadequate. 1
7 Most of
those nations require only assurances by the seller as to the pur-
chaser's end use." 8
3. Evasion of Exception Request Procedures
by COCOM Members
The most serious threat to COCOM as a viable safeguard of
Western security is the deliberate evasion of COCOM procedures
by member nations." 9 COCOM controls are circumvented by
member nations that do not file exception requests or ignore the
denial of requests, permitting surreptitious export of goods.120 The
most infamous of these incidents involved the Cyril Bath Co., a
United States machine tool manufacturer. Its request for permission
to export metal-forming presses to the Soviet Union was denied by
France.' 2 A French company, Loire-ACB, was already shipping
similar presses to the Soviets without notice to COCOM.1 22
4. United States COCOM Proposals
Considered Too Restrictive
Most United States officials believe that other COCOM mem-
ber nations are not sufficiently restrictive in the number and types
of high technology items they are willing to control.23 In contrast,
the other member nations consider United States export controls, as
embodied in the CCL and consequently included in United States
COCOM list proposals, too restrictive. 2 4 The close scrutiny and
117. See COMPT. GEN. No. i, supra note 37, at 44; H.R. REP. No. 190, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 20 (1977).
118. See supra note 117.
119. See infra text accompanying notes 120-22.
120. See, e.g., Export Licensing: Foreign Availability of Stretch Forming Presses, Hear-
ings Before the Subcomin. on International Economic Policy and Trade of the House Comm.
on International Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (pt. I) 1-19 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Export Licensing]; Bingham & Johnson, supra note 37, at 905.
121. See Export Licensing, supra note 120, at 1-19; AEI PROPOSALS, supra note 36, at
12; Bingham & Johnson, supra note 37, at 905.
122. Bingham & Johnson, supra note 37, at 905.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 100-07.
124. See Extension and Revision of the Export Administration Act of 1979, Hearings
and Markup Before the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (pt. II) 4
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excessive complexity 125 of United States export control policy has
resulted in failure by the United States to meet COCOM exception
request deadlines. 126 Such failure has led to charges that the United
States has intentionally delayed or denied approval to further its
own commercial interests. 127
B. Extraterritorial Application of United States Controls
The major problem with United States reexport controls stems
from their extraterritorial application to United States subsidiaries,
goods and data. ' 28 This practice, prompted by the ineffectiveness of
COCOM restrictions, 12 is viewed by COCOM allies as an infringe-
ment of their sovereignty. 30 This reaction is neither novel nor
exclusively limited to export controls. 3' Extraterritorial application
of the Export Control Act was a source of conflict between CO-
COM allies prior to the EAA 132 and similar difficulties persist in the
antitrust field. '33
The United States justifies its extraterritorial application of
export controls by reference to the nationality principle, which
(1979); COCOM List Review, supra note 37, at 111 (statement of Rep. Bingham); Ext. EAA,
supra note 37, at 164; CoMPT. GEN. No. 2, supra note 36, at 9-10; PRESIDENT'S REPORT, supra
note 37, at 3; Note, Reconciliation, supra note 37, at 445; see also Bingham & Johnson, supra
note 37, at 902. (characterizing the entire export-licensing process as inefficient, overencom-
passing and entrenched).
125. See infra note 152-60 and accompanying text.
126. See CoMpr, GEN. No. 2, supra note 36, at 11 (during the period from January-June
1977, the United States decided only 41 of 202 requests within 18 days and another 31 within
the two week extension).
127. See CoMPT. GEN. No. 1, supra note 37, at 47; Note, Reconciliation, supra note 37,
at 445; see also Ext. EAA, supra note 37, at 175; COMET. GEN. No. 2, supra note 36, at 11;
PRESIDENT'S REPORT, supra note 37, at 3 (citing the charges that the United States uses the
embargo for its commercial advantage).
128. See infra note 130 and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 100-27 and accompanying text.
130. See EAA '83, supra note 37, at 61, 67, 69, 70-71; PRESIDENT'S REPORT, supra note
37, at 4; Abbott, Linking Trade, supra note 37, at 840-42; Marcuss & Richard, Extraterritor-
ial Jurisdiction.in United States Trade Law: The Needfor a Consistent Theory, 20 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 439, 439-40 (1981); Norman, EC Urges U.S. Lawmakers Not to Extend
Export-Control Rules to Foreign Nations, Wall St. J., Mar. 16, 1984, at 31, col. 5.
131. See infra text accompanying notes 132-33.
132. See Berman & Garson, Export Controls, supra note 36, at 867-76.
133. See 1 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD §
4.01 (2d ed. 1981).
580 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 7:561
confers jurisdiction 3  based on residence and other connections
with United States companies. 35 Thus, a firm owned or controlled
in fact by a United States company may be subject to such controls
even though that subsidiary or affiliate is organized or incorporated
under foreign laws, has its principal place of business in a foreign
nation, and conducts most of its business abroad. 36 Application of
the nationality principle to export controls has been justified on the
ground that the right to impose conditions on the reexport of tech-
nology is inherent in the power to completely control all exports.13
7
United States courts have generally accepted the nationality princi-
ple.1 38 Thus, in F.T.C. v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-6-
Mousson,139 the court reiterated the traditional approach to extra-
territorial application of United States laws: A "clear congressional
intent" 140 that statutes and regulations be applied extraterritorially
must be found before such application will be judicially sanc-
tioned. '4'
Extraterritorial application of export controls may also be ana-
lyzed according to the approach adopted in Timberlane Lumber
Co. v. Bank of America,142 which requires a weighing of the United
States and foreign interests. 143 Application of the Timberlane ap-
proach, however, has been limited almost exclusively to an analysis
of the extraterritorial application of United States antitrust laws. 144
134. The term "jurisdiction" as used here includes not only the authority to prescribe
sanctions but also the authority to enforce them. See Mann, The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in
International Law, in 1 RECUEIL DES CoURs 1, 127-128 (1964).
135. See 1. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 303 (3d ed. 1979);
Marcuss & Richard, supra note 130, at 443.
136. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
137. Marcuss & Richard, supra note 130, at 478.
138. See RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
402 comments b, c (Tent. Draft No.2, 1981).
139. 636 F.2d 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
140. Id. at 1304.
141. See Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949); F.T.C. v. Compagnie de
Saint-Gobain-Pont-'a-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300, 1304 (D.C. Cir. 1980); United States v.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 518 F. Supp. 1021, 1032 (N.D. Ohio 1981).
142. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir.1976).
143. Id. at 613-14. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 40 (1962). "Where two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce rules of law
and the rules they may prescribe require inconsistent conduct upon the part of a person, each
state is required by international law to consider, in good faith, moderating the exercise of its
enforcement jurisdiction .... "" Id.
144. See Recent Developments, Export Controls, supra note 84, at 208.
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Other COCOM nations protest the application of United
States reexport controls within their borders against companies they
consider domestic business enterprises. 45 They argue that the lack
of corresponding controls in their own national export laws pro-
hibits application of United States export controls. 146 These nations
have occasionally defeated prosecution of violators by refusing to
extradite. 47 The International Court of Justice also rejected the
reliance by the United States on the nationality principle in Barce-
lona Traction, Light and Power Co. ,48 In Barcelona, the court held
that a corporation's nationality is determined by its place of and the
location of its registered office. 49 This holding conflicts with the
EAA's definition of the "United States person" as including "any
foreign subsidiary or affiliate . . . controlled in fact"'150 by a United
States company. 15'
C. Dual Licensing Cases
A final problem regarding the policing of reexports of United
States technology involves the interaction of COCOM and United
States controls, otherwise known as the "dual licensing" cases. 152
Such cases arise when an exporter from a COCOM member nation
wishes to reexport a United States good also on the COCOM list. 153
145. See EAA '83, supra note 37, at 61, 67, 69, 70-71; PRESIDENT'S REPORT, supra note
37, at 4; Abbott, Linking Trade, supra note 37, at 841; Marcuss & Richard, supra note 130,
at 439-40; Norman, supra note 130, at 31, col. 5.
146. Unlike the United States, these countries do not have reexport controls. See THE
Bucy REPORT, supra note 37, at 20; 25TH BATTLE ACT REPORT 40-54 (1972); Baker & Bohlig,
The Control of Exports-A Comparison of the Laws of the United States, Canada, Japan,
and the Federal Republic of Germany, 1 INT'L LAW. 163, 187-91 (1967); Note, Reconcilia-
tion, supra note 37, at 445, 447; Note, EAA, supra note 109, at 192.
147. See Palmer, Problems of Enforcement of National Security Export Controls Involv-
ing Illegal Conduct Abroad, in Transfer of U.S. High Technology, supra note 1, at 75-77.
148. (BeIg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 1 (Judgment of Feb. 5).
149. Id. at 41-44 (nationality for purposes of diplomatic convention),
150. Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. app. § 241(2) (1976 & Supp. III
1979) (emphasis added). See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
151. While the United States generally seeks to reconcile conflicts between its federal
law and international law, Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900), the Export Adminis-
tration Act illustrates how U.S. federal law supersedes international law where the two are
irreconcilable. See The Over The Top, 5 F.2d 838, 842 (D. Conn. 1925). See generally Note,
Extraterritorial Application of the Export Administration Act of 1979 Under International
and American Law, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1308, 1315-34 (1983) (discussion of these principles as
applied to the Dresser Industries case).
152. See CoMeT. GEN. No. 1, supra note 37, at 34.
153. See id.
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In this instance, the exception request of that company's govern-
ment must be considered by both EDAC (regarding the granting of
COCOM exception request) 154 and by ACEP (to receive a validated
United States reexport license). 155 Though the groups have virtually
the same membership 56 and consider the same factors,157 EDAC
usually considers the exception request only after ACEP review.' 8
This dual review adds months to the lengthy process of obtaining a
United States decision on an exception request 159 and leads to
charges that such reviews are redundant and symptomatic of the
complexity of United States controls.160
IV. PROPOSALS
A. COCOM
One of the three major proposals to alter COCOM is to elevate
the group to the status of a formal treaty organization,16' Such an
elevation would impress upon all signatories the importance of
national security controls. 162 Opponents of a COCOM treaty be-
lieve it would be counterproductive because it could lead to the
destruction of COCOM if other members are unwilling to conclude
a formal treaty. 16 3
154. See supra text accompanying notes 47, 57.
155. See supra text accompanying notes 78, 90.
156. See Ext. EAA, supra note 37, at 176 (statement of Rep. Downey).
157. See CoMPT. GEN. No. 1, supra note 37, at 34.
158. Id.
159. See CoMp-r. GEN. No. 2, supra note 38, at 11.
160. See id. at iii, 16.
161. Representative Jim Courter (R.-N.J.), among the most prominent and influential
backers of the measure, sponsored an amendment to H.R. 3231. See supra note 82. The
Courter Amendment would require the President to attempt to upgrade the status of the
COCOM agreement through negotiations with our COCOM allies. See 129 CoNG. REc.
H8341-42, H8343 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1983) (statement of Rep. Courter). While the Courter
Amendment was rejected, 129 CONG. REc. H8346 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1983), the Senate bill to
amend the Export Administration Act, S. 979, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5(25) (1983), would
require the President to negotiate the establishment of a COCOM treaty. Id. See EAA '83,
supra note 37, at 46.
162. See 129 CONG. REC. H8341-42 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1983) (statement of Rep. Cour-
ter).
163. See EAA '83, supra note 37, at 46 (statement of Kenneth W. Dam, Deputy
Secretary of State); PRESIDENT's REPORT, supra note 37, at 4. See also Bingham & Johnson,
supra note 37, at 904, (European sensitivity to pressure from the left may be the cause of
those COCOM members' unwillingness to conclude a treaty).
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It has also been proposed that the United States abolish
EDAC.16 4 This idea has been prompted by the fact that all excep-
tion requests considered by EDAC require ACEP licenses. 65 Also,
EDAC and ACEP have the same membership'66 and consider the
same factors regarding export licenses and exception requests.' 67
Proponents of this measure argue that, in addition to avoiding
redundancy, centralizing exception requests and export licenses
within ACEP would provide for greater administrative account-
ability. 168
The major obstacle to eliminating EDAC is the Department of
State's resistance to relinquishing its role in making foreign policy
recommendations concerning the export control system.16 9 Since a
Department of State representative is EDAC's chairperson, 70 the
Department fears that abolition of EDAC would eliminate the use
of export licenses and exception request approvals or denials as
diplomatic tools. 17
A final proposal has been that COCOM eliminate the secrecy
shrouding its list and proceedings.' 7 2 Although COCOM members
believe that confidentiality permits maintenance of more effective
controls, 1 73 critics contend that secrecy is maintained for the benefit
of European member nations, who are sensitive to domestic pres-
sure from the left, and for the United States, whose representatives
fear the backlash created by the public anger at their government's
acquiescence in the lax COCOM control system.174
164. See COMT. GEN. No. 2, supra note 36, at vi, 16; Note, Reconciliation, supra note
37, at 448.
165. This is because all COCOM list items are generally included in the U.S. CCL. See
CoMErT. GEN. No. 1, supra note 37, at 34.
166. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
167. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
168. See COMp'T. GEN. No. 2, supra note 37, at 31, 42; see also Bingham & Johnson
supra note 37, at 902, (characterizing the entire export-licensing process as inefficient,
overencompassing and entrenched),
169. See Ext. EAA, supra note 37, at 176 (statement of Maynard W. Glitman, Deputy
Assistant Secretary, Int'l Trade Pol'y, Dep't of State).
170. See COMPT. GEN. No. 1, supra note 37, at 34.
171. See supra note 169.
172. See COCOM List Review, supra note 37, at 68 (calls to eliminate COCOM
secrecy),
173. DEP'r Or COM., supra note 37, at 12 (1981).
174. See Bingham & Johnson, supra note 37, at 904.
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B. United States Controls
1. Decontrol Exports to COCOM Nations
One of the three major proposals to modify United States
controls is to decontrol the export of all goods to COCOM na-
tions. 75 Section 106(b) of H.R. 3231176 would provide for the elimi-
nation of the export license requirement for United States exports to
overseas 177 COCOM member nations.17  Proponents of this measure
stress that only 6 export licenses have been denied for exports to
COCOM member nations out of 75,000 requests during the period
1981-1983.17 Further, supporters of section 106(b) point to its ex-
ception clause, which allows the Secretary to require export licenses
for exports to end-users suspected of diverting United States goods,
as an adequate safeguard against subsequent diversions. 80 More-
over, in lieu of a license, a notification provision requires exporters
to notify the Secretary of their exports.' 8'
Opponents of section 106(b) believe that its passage into law
would eliminate any initial check on exports from the United States
since there is no requirement that notice of export be given prior to
shipment. 8 2 Thus, the United States would lose the traceable "pa-
per trail" needed to determine whether the goods are eventually
being diverted.183 Opponents of the measure also argue that the
reason for the limited number of denials is that the vast majority of
prospective importers of United States goods in COCOM member
nations are careful to comply with United States requirements;
175. See infra text accompanying notes 176-81.
176. H.R. 3231, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 106(b), 129 CONG. REC. H7699 (daily ed. Sept.
29, 1983).
177. Most exports from the United States to Canada require no export license and thus
would not be affected by passage of section 106(b). 15 C.F.R. § 370.3 (1983). But cf.
Lachica, supra note 114, at 34, col. 1 (U.S. officials warn Canada of possible revocation of
Canada's exemption from licensing requirements). It is important to note, however, that the
reexports of U.S. goods and data from Canada do require an export license. 15 C.F.R. §
374.1 (1983); supra note 78.
178. See supra note 38.
179. See 129 CONG. REC. H8262 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1983) (statement of Rep. Bonker).
180. See 129 CONG. REC. H8263, H8268 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1983) (statements of Reps.
Bonker and Frenzel).
181. See 129 CONG. REc. H8263 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1983) (statement of Rep. Bonker).
182. See 129 CONG. REC. H8262-63 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1983) (statement of Rep.
Hunter); 129 CONG. REC. H7454 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1983) (statement of Rep. Roth).
183. See EAA '83, supra note 37, at 46.
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compliance is guaranteed only because the importers know that the
United States strictly scrutinizes their applications, 184 Removing the
licensing requirement, they bontend, would'facilitate diversions, 85
while relegating all policing of diversions to already understaffed
COCOM agencies. 18 6
2. Reducing the Scope of the CCL
A second proposal has been to reduce the number of items on
the United States CCL in order to permit more effective policing of
the most significant ones. 18 7 This proposal would also have an
ameliatory effect on the COCOM control system since a reduced
number of items on the CCL would naturally lead to a reduction in
United States proposals for additions to the COCOM list. 188 The
Bucy Report, 189 a 1976 analysis of United States export controls by a
government-business task force, recommended that the United
States narrow its export-control policy in order to concentrate on
critical technologies, and incorporate those changes into the CO-
COM list. 19 0 In defining "critical technologies" the Bucy Report
establishes guidelines that: (1) advocate the control of design and,
manufacturing know-how, as opposed to finished products; 1 1 (2)
concentrate on "active" transfers, i.e. transfers of technology in
which the interaction between East and West may be most intense,
as opposed to "passive" transfers;192 and (3) concentrate on technol-
ogy that represents a "revolutionary," as opposed to an "evolution-
ary," advance to the receiving nation.193 Although the Bucy Report
184. See 129 CONG. REC. H8265-66 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1983) (statement of Rep. Roth).
185, Id.
186. Id.; see supra note 114.
187. See, e.g., Zonderman, supra note 20, at 132 (calls by observers to reduce CCL's
scope).
188. See PPESIDENT's REPoRT, supra note 37, at 5; Bingham & Johnson, supra note 37, at
907.
189. See supra note 37.
190. See THE Bucy REPOFT, supra note 38, at 15-16, 19, 20. See also 129 CONG. REC.
H7452, H7456, H7460 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1983) (statements of Reps. Bonker, Roth, and
Mica) (voicing support of critical technologies approach); Zonderman, supra note 20, at 125,
132 (discussion of Bucy Report).
191. THE Bucy REPoR, supra note 37, at 1-2.
192. Id. at 4.
193. Id. at 9.
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has not been widely implemented by policy makers,1 94 section
106(n) of H.R. 3231 embodies the Report's essence. It provides for
the elimination from the CCL of goods controlled solely because
they contain microprocessors that cannot bi altered to perform
alternative functions.19 5 Such products remain controlled despite
the wide availability of microprocessors worldwide.96
3. United States Retaliatory Ban on Imports
The third proposal, included in section 9(7) of S. 979, would
allow the President to ban imports from foreign companies that
violate COCOM controls, provided that such sanctions are ap-
proved by COCOM.9 7 Proponents of this measure believe that the
ban will provide COCOM with an effective enforcement mecha-
nism while offsetting the pecuniary gain of companies that violate
COCOM controls. 198 Opponents of section 9(7) contend that other
COCOM member nations may view the new sanctions as another
extraterritorial application of export controls. 9 9
194. While no specific reason for the Bucy Report's quasi-rejection has been voiced,
many "hard-liners"-those who believe a tightening of export controls is necessary to protect
U.S. technology-consider the Bucy Report too liberal -in its control relaxation. See Zonder-
man, supra note 20, at 102. But compare Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. §
2404(d)(2) (1976 & Supp. III 1979) (detailing Secretary of Defenses' role in defining "militar-
ily critical technologies") with THE BucY REPORT, supra note 37, at 1 (partial incorporation of
Bucy Report into section of Export Administration Act).
195. H.R. 3231, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 106(n), 129 CONG. REC. H7700 (daily ed. Sept.
29, 1983).
196. See Bingham & Johnson, supra note 20, at 902.
197. S. 979, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 9(7) (1983), amended by Amendment No. 2743, 130
CONG. REG. S1719 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1984).
198. See S. REP. No. 170, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 18-19 (1983); 130 CONG. REC. S1719-20
(daily ed. Feb. 27, 1984) (statement of Sen. Heinz). See also 129 CONG. REC. H7461 (daily ed.
Sept. 26, 1983), H7714-15 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1983) (statements of Rep. Snowe supporting
the inclusion of a section 9(7)-like provision into H.R.3231).
199. See 130 Cong. Rec. S1716-17 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1984) (statement of Sen. Dan-
forth); Norman, supra note 130, at 31, col. 5. A final major proposal described in H.R. 3231,
§ 108, 129 CONG. REC. H7700 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1983), would prohibit the Secretary from
requiring validated licenses for the export of goods available in foreign markets six months
after the President begins talks which fail to eliminate foreign availability. Id. Supporters
argue that such a law would exclude from the CCL goods that are no longer of strategic
importance and are available in foreign markets. See 129 CONG. REc. H7456, H7463 (daily
ed. Sept. 26, 1983) (statements of Reps. Berman and Zschau). Opponents contend that six
months is insufficient time to conclude these negotiations and may result in the inability of
the United States to restrict U.S. exporters who are selling high technology which should still
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V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
The United"States should immediately implement the follow-
ing four-step program: elimination of EDAC, decontrol of exports
to COCOM member nations, reductions in the CCL, and establish-
ment of a retaliatory ban against foreign companies that violate
COCOM controls.
A. Abolishing EDAC
By abolishing EDAC the United States would eliminate the
redundancy of EDAC and ACEP review. 200 Further, this would
provide for greater accountability in formulating export control
policy by centralizing policy-making in a single organization.2 10
Most importantly, elimination of EDAC would enable the United
States to speed up its consideration of COCOM member nation
export license and exception requests, 20 2 the delay of which is a
constant source of friction within COCOM. 20 3 Those who oppose
such a measure by claiming it strips the United States of an effective
foreign policy tool20 4 fail to realize the uselessness of United States
controls in the face of foreign availability. 20 5 Thus, by accommo-
dating COCOM allies with an efficient method of processing li-
cense and exception requests, the United States would be fostering
greater cooperation between all COCOM member nations while
receiving enhanced COCOM involvement in preventing diver-
sions. 206
B. Decontrolling Exports to COCOM Member-Nations
By decontrolling exports to COCOM member nations, the
United States would reduce Commerce Department paperwork by
be controlled. See 129 CONG. REC. H7794 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1983) (statement of Rep.
Solomon); 129 CoNG. REC, H7455, H7461-62 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1983) (statements of Reps.
Roth, Snowe, and Solomon). Although this provision bears on national security controls, its
prospective effects on Soviet diversions would be negligible.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 164-67.
201. See supra text accompanying note 168.
202. See supra text accompanying note 126.
203. See supra text accompanying note 127.
204. See supra text accompanying note 169.
205. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
206. See CoMPT. GEN. No. 2, supra note 36, at 15.
1984]
588 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 7:561
eliminating approximately 25,000 license applications each year. 20 7
Claims that the United States would lose a check on a good's initial
export 08 and a method of tracing goods after their export 20 9 are ill-
conceived. Should a situation arise when the Secretary believes a
license requirement is warranted, section 106(b) of H.R. 3231 gives
the Secretary the discretion to require one. 210 Additionally, ex-
porters must always give notice of exports to the Secretary.21' Be-
fore implementing such decontrol, however, Congress should ex-
pressly specify that notice of export be given prior to shipment.21 2 In
addition to reducing paperwork, decontrol would provide other
substantial benefits to the United States. First, decontrol would
create goodwill within COCOM. 213 Also, decontrol would enable
Commerce to reallocate its resources in order to better police sus-
pected diversions.2 14
C. Reductions in the CCL
By modifying the CCL to include only critical technology the
United States would enable the Commerce Department to shift its
resources toward the monitoring of suspected diversions.215 Critics
who fear that a reduction in the breadth of the CCL would result in
an excessively relaxed export-control posture should take note of the
present policy, which restricts the availability of the most elemen-
tary microprocessors. 216 Such an unrealistic policy should be reme-
died by modification of the CCL, including the passage of section
106(n) of H.R. 3231.217 This would satisfy COCOM allies, who
would be required to handle fewer applications for exception re-
quests, 1 8 and whose companies would have to apply for fewer
reexport licenses. 21 9
207. See supra text accompanying note 179.
208. See supra text accompanying note 182.
209. See supra text accompanying note 183.
210. H.R. 3231, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 106(b), 129 CONG. REC. H7689 (daily ed. Sept.
29, 1983).
211. See 129 CONG. REC. H8263 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1983) statement of Rep. Bonker).
212. See supra text accompanying note 182.
213. See 129 CONG. REC. H8263 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1983) (statement of Rep. Mica).
214. See 129 CONG. REC. 1-18264 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1983) (statement of Rep. Mica).
215. See 129 CONG. REC. H8262 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1983) (statement of Rep. Bonker).
216. See Bingham & Johnson, supra note 37, at 902.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 194-96.
218. See supra text accompanying notes 187-88.
219. See supra text accompanying note 78.
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D. Establishment of a Retaliatory Ban
As the final step in the proposed program, the United States
should ban imports from foreign companies that violate COCOM
controls. 220 This would provide COCOM with an enforcement
mechanism, albeit unilateral in nature, which would force ex-
porters engaged in diversions to weigh the gain from a sale to the
Soviet bloc against the loss of all future sales in the United States. 22 1
These sanctions should not be considered as a further extraterritor-
ial application of export controls222 because these sanctions must be
approved by a majority of COCOM member nations.2 23
E. A Prospective Fifth Step
The United States should also attempt to gradually implement
the conclusion of a COCOM treaty224 and the elimination of CO-
COM secrecy. 225 Elevation of COCOM to treaty status, with the
obligations of the signatories formally established, would firmly
impress upon all COCOM member nations the importance of ex-
port controls to collective security.226 However, the present unwill-
ingness of other COCOM member nations to enter into such a
treaty suggests that the United States should move slowly in this
area. 227 The purpose of the COCOM treaty is to enlist greater
COCOM cooperation in preventing diversions; this objective will
be achieved not through United States petulance but by reminding
our COCOM allies of United States concessions made regarding
EDAC, United States exports to COCOM, and the CCL. 228
Abolishing COCOM secrecy would subject COCOM proceed-
ings to public scrutiny and thus have the effect of imposing greater
standards of public accountability on COCOM member nations. 229
220. See S. 979, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 9(7) (1983), amended by Amendment No. 2743,
130 CONG. REC. S1719 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1984).
221. See S. REP. No. 170, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1983).
222. See supra text accompanying note 199.
223. S. 979, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 9(7) (1983), amended by Amendment No. 2743, 130
CONG. REC. S1719 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1984).
224, See supra text accompanying notes 161-63.
225. See supra text accompanying notes 172-74.
226. See 129 CONG. REC. H8341-42 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1983) (statement of Rep. Cour-
ter).
227. See supra text accompanying note 163.
228. See supra text accompanying note 200-19.
229. See supra text accompanying note 168.
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Although most members of COCOM, including the United States,
favor the maintenance of COCOM's confidentiality on national
security grounds, 230 others contend that such secrecy serves only to
protect the governments of COCOM member nations from the
criticism that would almost certainly ensue from public scrutiny of
COCOM proceedings. 23' The national security justification for CO-
COM secrecy is illusory since the Soviets and their allies are well
aware of which goods they are being denied. The United States
should attempt to persuade the rest of COCOM to eliminate the
secrecy surrounding it in the hope that public awareness of the
laxity of COCOM control enforcement will yield demands for
greater measures to prevent diversions. 232
F. Additional Prospects
In addition to the favored proposals already discussed, two
more must be added. First, the United States should enter into
negotiations with Austria, Sweden, and Switzerland in order to
stop the massive flow of United States technology diverted through
those non-COCOM nations.2 33 Through such negotiations, the
United States should attempt either to enlist the three nations in
COCOM, or to achieve bilateral agreements more protective of
United States national security interests. 234 Second, the United
States should refrain from applying its export controls extraterritor-
ially, except for national security reasons. 235 This will soothe the
COCOM allies angered over previous such applications, while en-
230. See DEP'T OF COM., ExPoRT ADMINISTRATION ANNUAL REPORT FY 1980, at 12
(1981).
231. See supra text accompanying note 174.
232. See Bingham & Johnson, supra note 20, at 904.
233. See supra text accompanying notes 22-27, 112-13. See also Noble, Exporter Is
Fined $3 Million By U.S., N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 1984, at 1, col. 5 (diversion of radar system
to Soviet Union by Swedish firm); Kohan, The KGB, TIME, Feb. 14, 1983, at 42 (statement of
U.S. high technology executive that "[i]f every piece of equipment shipped to Vienna stayed
there, the city would sink").
234. See also Lachica, Reagan Institutes Export Controls System That Could Speed Up
Technology Trade, Wall St. J., Mar. 26, 1984, at 8, col. 2; Lachica, New U.S. Technology
Export Guidelines Broaden Pentagon's License Review Role, Wall St. J., Mar. 22, 1984, at
10, col. 1 (noting establishment of new administrative guidelines that will allow the Depart-
ment of Defense the right to review export licenses of sensitive technology to Austria,
Switzerland, and Sweden in order to prevent Soviet diversions).
235. See supra text accompanying notes 128-33.
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gendering greater COCOM cooperation to prevent Soviet diver-
sions.2 36 Further, the goodwill generated among foreign COCOM
members will, in light of the ineffectiveness of United States foreign
policy sanctions, greatly outweigh any possible harm to United
States interests.237
CONCLUSION
In order to maintain Western security, the United States and
its COCOM allies must preserve the West's scientific and technolog-
ical superiority over the Soviet bloc. The recommended proposals
would do this by limiting the success of Soviet diversions of United
States technology through a four-pronged approach. The proposed
steps would, first, concentrate on the control of only critical tech-
nology; second, modify United States export control policy in order
to engender greater COCOM cooperation; third, impress upon
COCOM allies the importance of export controls to Western secur-
ity; and fourth, provide economic disincentives to violators of ex-
port controls. While it is unrealistic to believe that Soviet diversions
of United States technology can be completely thwarted, the United
States and its COCOM allies can significantly impede them by
implementing the proposed policies. This would preserve the tech-
nological "lead time" on which Western security depends.
James Plousadis
236. Id.
237. See supra note 109.
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